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Transfer of Technology to Colombia:
A Proposal to Modify Decision 24
ROBERT J. RADWAY*
I. INTRODUCTION
The debate on technology transfer to Latin America and other de-
veloping countries for a long time has centered around "black box"
technology.' It was presumed by the developing country economists,
once it was discovered that technology was the key to development,
that acquiring control over inventions and the patent system would
facilitate the adaptation of foreign technology to local needs. A num-
ber of studies were undertaken to analyze the process of technology
transfer, primarily involving license agreements, and the resulting in-
formation provided the basis for the technology transfer legislation
that emerged throughout the 1970s. Technology ("black box") had to
be purchased, not leased. Outright purchase would include the right
to use the technology after the expiration of the agreement (commonly
thought of in terms of a patent license). It was believed that this
would facilitate the adaptation process.
The thesis of this article is that it is not the "black box" that is the
heart of the technology required for industrialization. Rather, it is the
unpatented know-how and the technical assistance, which are referred
to as "intangible technology," that is the true essence required for com-
mercialization of the technology, industrialization, and social and eco-
nomic development.
The Latin American countries have been the leaders among the
developing countries in passing laws regulating the transfer and control
of technology. Within Latin America, the technology transfer policies
of the countries comprising the Andean Common Market (ANCOM)
have established one of the most controversial regimes directed toward
* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of Law; B.B.A., M.B.A., Uni-
versity of Michigan; former Legal Advisor, Council of the Americas; Co-editor,
Reference Manual on Doing Business in Latin America.
1. "Black box" technology refers to the notion that technology can be de-
fined as consisting of a discrete piece of hardware, e.g., a computer, which can
then be transferred. This author takes issue with such a characterization and
uses the "black box" idea as a starting point only.
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this end. ANCOM Decision 242 effectively set forth a code regulating
the development and transfer of technology within the subregion.
Article 21 of Decision 24 declares that when "intangible techno-
logical contributions" are made "to a foreign enterprise by its parent
company or some other affiliate of the same enterprise, payment of
royalties shall not be authorized nor will any deduction be accepted
for this reason for tax purposes." Since all contracts regarding the im-
portation of technology (broadly defined) must be approved and reg-
istered by the appropriate agency of the respective member country in
order to be valid and binding, Article 21 has become an important
factor in a risk analysis bearing on decisions to transfer technology.
This article is a brief for the position that intangible technological
contributions, particularly in the form of licenses of unpatented know-
how and technical assistance, are the most vital forms of technology
for development, and their transfer should, therefore, be encouraged
by any reasonable means. Since the bulk of this form of technology is
transferred by transnational corporations (TNCs) to their local sub-
sidiaries, and Article 21 has the effect of limiting such transfers by
making them unprofitable, it is time to call for a modification of Arti-
cle 21.
II. BACKGROUND
Colombia has the most extensive history of direct regulation of
licensing and technical assistance agreements of any of the countries
in the Andean Pact, and is second only to Brazil in all of Latin America
in this regard. Since 1967, the right to remit foreign currencies for
payment of royalties, commissions, trademarks, patents, and technical
services has been directly regulated by Decree Law 444,' as amended
and regulated by Decree 688 of 1967. In that same year, the deduct-
ibility of payments for the transfer of intangible property rights, in-
cluding technical assistance fees and royalties of all kinds, was made
2. Andean Common Market Foreign Investment Code, Decision 24: Com-
mon Regime of Treatment of Foreign Capital and of Trademarks, Patents, Li-
censes, and Royalties (as amended), December 31, 1970, reprinfed in 11 INTL
LEGAL MATERaLS 126 (1972) (translation by U.S. Department of State). See
art. 21 at 134.
3. Decree Law 444 of March 22, 1967, 30 LEGISLAcIoN ECONOMICA 191
(1967).
4. Decree Law 688 of April 20, 1967, 30 LEGISLACION ECONOMICA 247
(1967).
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subject to prior approval by the taxing authority under Law 63V As
applied, this approval has been used in conjunction with the policies
of the Royalty Committee under Decree Law 444, adding the possibil-
ity that these payments will be non-deductible as well as non-
remittable.
The Royalty Committee, comprised of representatives of the Min-
istry of Development, the National Planning Department, the Super-
intendent of Foreign Trade, the Prefect of Exchange Control, and the
Head of the Office of Exchange (Central Bank), was established in 1967
to approve technology agreements in accordance with a stated criteria.
The experience acquired, and the body of statistical knowledge devel-
oped by the Royalty Committee regarding the nature of royalty and
technical assistance agreements was transmitted directly to the organiz-
ing committees for the Andean Pact in the late 1960s, and provided the
raw material and the motivation for the formulation of the Andean
Group policies, and particularly Decision 24.
This analysis advances the thesis that a rigid application of the
policy on licensing royalties and technical assistance payments, partic-
ularly to transactions between companies with common capital, is in
many situations, contrary to the goals of Colombian national policy.
It is believed that a more flexible approach, such as that adopted by
Mexico I or Argentina,' would continue to accomplish the necessary
screening and discouragement of non-essential technology, while at the
same time permitting the introduction of needed foreign technology
and technical assistance to supplement local resources.
III. COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT TECHNOLOGY PoLIcY
The present policy is based upon maximum utilization of locally-
produced raw materials, and includes the objective of adding value to
the highest degree within Colombia in order to create more jobs and
reduce unnecessary imports. This encourages the creation and instal-
lation of small processing plants in the outlying regions of the country,
close to the areas where crops or other raw materials are produced.
5. Law 63 of December 26, 1967, 31 LEGISLACION ECONoMICA 472 (1967).
See Lacy, Technology and Industrial Property Licensing in Latin America: A
Legislative Revolution, 2 INT'L LAW. 388, 390 (1972).
6. The Mexican law on technology transfer, patents, and trademarks con-
tains no provision like Article 21 of Decision 24. See 315 D.O. - (Dec. 30,
1972).
7. Law 21,617 [1977] C. Anales 2559, 2563, governs technology transfer
to Argentina. See generally Radway and Giacehino, Argentina, in TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER: LAWS AND PRACTICE IN LATIN AMEILICA (1978).
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This policy also promotes the introduction of technology in which
labor-intensive processes will replace capital-intensive processes de-
veloped in countries " where labor costs are higher than in Colombia.
To emphasize the importance of this kind of technology, attractive
financing has been made available by the government for the develop-
ment of such products or processes.
Another basic aspect of the policy is to disaggregate technology
packages to obtain only those elements of the package not otherwise
available locally. It has long been known that many large foreign in-
vestments made by multinational corporations have included elements
of the package (such as financing) which can be broken down and
sometimes obtained at lower cost locally or from other sources.9
Along with the aforementioned objectives, the policy emphasizes
adaptation of technology to local conditions. Raw materials may have
different levels of quality in each country. Variations exist in environ-
mental and climatological conditions, soil, handling and storage tech-
niques, and even in the chemical composition of water. Thus, various
processes must be adapted to conditions prevailing in Colombia or the
processes simply will not be economically feasible.
The utilization of national companies in the metalworking or light
engineering industry is another priority and shall be incorporated wher-
ever possible. In order to implement this objective, the system for
licensing imports has been designed so that "INCOMEX"'O will coor-
dinate its operations with other appropriate agencies to accomplish this
objective. The Institute of Technology Research (IIT)" will also
evaluate the applications for products in this sector. It is understood
that this local preference occasionally will involve higher prices charged
by less efficient local companies, but this is preferred in order to im-
prove the efficiency of local industry.
Finally, a major concern and objective of the government is the
improvement of quality control in the food processing and manufactur-
ing industries. Efforts in this field have been underway for many years,
but the Government of Colombia currently faces a dilemma. Some
8. These nations includes the United States and other industrialized coun-
tries, such as those of Western Europe and Japan.
9. This is the concept known as "unbundling" or disaggregation. See Rad-
way, Negotiating with Latin American Governments: Technology Transfer and
Service Agreements, 9 LAw. Am. 283 (1977).
10. Instituto Colombiano de Comercio Exterior (Colombian Government
agency responsible for import and export permits for foreign investors).
11. Instituto de Investigaciones Technol6gicos (Colombian Government Tech-
nology Research Institute).
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producers have become accustomed to protective conditions and have
not been required to improve their quality to desired levels. At the
same time, fluctuations in economic conditions, particularly in the
balance of payments, have resulted in such a degree of control that im-
port competition has not been a major challenge to some of these in-
efficient producers.
IV. TECHNOLOGY AND COLOMBIAN DEVELOPMENT
A. Definition of Technology
Technology has been defined in various ways. It encompasses, at
least, all of the knowledge necessary for the productive functioning of
a single operation, an enterprise or, perhaps, an entire society. The
term customarily embraces "hardware," such as equipment, machinery,
products, factories, water treatment and distribution facilities, storage
and processing facilities, and simple tools. In addition to hardware,
the term also includes "software," such as the intangible experience,
knowledge, and "know-how" only partially embodied in specifications,
as well as engineering designs and models, systems of calibration, me-
trology and standardization training systems, techniques, and manuals.
This intangible concept also covers the skills of integration, coordina-
tion, communication, and management of all of the elements of a
productive system. 2 The term may or may not involve patents and
trademarks, the transfer of the rights to use those assets (traditionally
referred to as "industrial property rights"), and technical and mana-
gerial assistance in any element of the productive system.
B. Contributions of Technology
Technology, therefore, can make a contribution to the production
and the economics of manufacturing and food processing systems. It
may take the form of new products or processes, or improvements to
existing products or processes. In the food processing industry, tech-
nology frequently may take the form of advances in research. The com-
mercialization of new developments is an ill-defined area, based on
experience in recent years.
12. A shorter definition would be "the experience and knowledge as applied
to improve productivity or productive efficiency." See THE CONTRIBUTION OF
TRANSNATIONAL ENTERPRISES TO FUTURE WORLD DEVELOPMENT 5-11 (1979)
(report prepared by the Industrial Sector Advisory Group to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for
Development).
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A significant, but inadequately understood, form of technology in
manufacturing derives from the experience of operating machinery or
equipment in different countries with widely varying conditions, in-
cluding considerable variation in raw materials, feedstock, or other in-
put. This type of intangible technology tends to resolve critical pro-
duction problems and constitutes a small investment for the large
return it brings in substantially reducing "down" time and work
stoppages.
C. Vital Elements: Training and Adaptation
Technical assistance can be seen as providing an appropriate means
to transfer from the supplier to the recipient the benefit of the sup-
plier's experience with the process of commercialization and the adap-
tation of the technology to the conditions prevailing in the receiving
country. The two central and vital elements of this process are: (a)
training; and (b) adaptation assistance through experience transfer.
In recent years, it has been found that most effective transfers re-
sult from the utilization of the following modes or methods: (1) prac-
tical demonstrations by experienced experts (home office personnel);
(2) personal visits by experienced experts (discussions); (3) training
programs at the home office; and (4) attendance at meetings and trade
fairs.1" The institutions that are singularly well-placed and qualified
to provide the critical links in the chain are the transnational cor-
porations.
Private corporations operate to satisfy the economic interests of
the sources of capital with which they have been organized. In order
to enlist the capabilities, particularly the training and technical as-
sistance that lie in the experience of the trausnationals, the proper
investment environment must exist. In addition to a political climate
of stability, a proper legal framework for the promotion of investment
and the development and acquisition of technology is essential.
13. Saeng, Food Technology Transfer in Latin America 9, paper presented
at Symposium of Food Technology in Latin America (Annual Meeting of Insti-
tute of Food Technologists, Dallas, Texas, June 1978). This has been identified
in a series of surveys conducted for various industries over the last few years.
This is eminently logical in that "commercialization" of any given technology is
a form of technology itself.
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V. THE LEGAL FRAMEwoRK IN COLOMBIA
A. Decree 444
In Colombia, this legal framework consists of Decree 444,14 as
amended by Decree 688.15 Both laws were enacted in 1967. Decree
444 was enacted to provide international exchange and foreign trade
rules in order to promote economic and social development and to
strengthen the balance of payments by a variety of means."8 These
include: (a) the promotion and diversification of exports; (b) correct
use of the available foreign exchange; (c) control of the demand for
foreign exchange, with special regard to preventing speculative trans-
actions and the flight of capital; (d) encouragement of foreign capital
investment in accordance with the general interests of the national
economy; (e) the repatriation of capital and regulation of Colombian
investments abroad; and (f) the establishment and maintenance of
a level of reserves sufficient for the normal management of interna-
tional exchange.
Chapter VII of Decree 444 contains provisions with respect to
payments in foreign currency for various services, including royalties,
trademarks and patents, 8 "services," 19 and "technical, scientific or ar-
tistic services" 20 (provided that the services are socially, economically,
technically, and culturally useful to the country). Article 2" provides
that, in order for remittances to be made abroad for royalties, commis-
sions, use of trademarks, patents, and the like, all contracts executed
as of the effective date of that law and all extensions of pre-existing
contracts had to be registered at the Office of Exchange (of the Cen-
tral Bank), after being approved by the Royalty Committee.
B. Decree 1234
In 1972, the enactment of Decree 1234 22 provided certain criteria
for the contents and registration of contracts involving transfer of
14. See note 3 supra.
15. See note 4 supra.
16. Decree Law 444 of 1967, Article 1; see note 3 supra. Colombian Presi-
dent Carlos Lleras Restrepo was concerned with the extreme fluctuations in the
price of coffee as well as other factors severely affecting the economic cycles in
that country at the time.
17. Id. at art. 1.
18. Id. at arts. 93 and 102.
19. Id.
20. Id. at art. 101.
21. Article 2 refers to conformance with the provisions of Chapters VII and
VIII of Decree Law 444, which includes Articles 93 et seq.
22. Decree Law 1234 of July 18, 1972, 41 LECISLACION ECONOMICA 24
(1972).
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technology. The law also established criteria for approval of these
agreements.
C. Decree 1900
In 1973, Decree 190023 was enacted. It is effectively implemented
Decision 24 2 of the Andean Pact, known as the Common Rules for
Treatment of Foreign Capital and of Trademarks, Patents, Licenses,
and Royalties. These three laws, as amended, constitute the basic
legal framework for the attraction of foreign capital and technology
to supplement national resources in the movement toward economic
development in Colombia.
VI. APPLICATION OF THE LAWS: ROYALTY
COMMITTEE POLICIES AND IMPLEMENTATION
Earlier in this article, the composition of the Royalty Committee
was set forth. That Committee has functioned quite actively since
1967, and it appears that particular behavioral patterns have emerged.
It seems that certain basic attitudes exist on the part of the individual
members of the Royalty Committee which are expressed in the form
of the approvals granted and policies promulgated.
There appears to have been an absolute prohibition on the
payment of know-how license royalties from majority-owned TNC
subsidiaries to their foreign parents or to any other affiliated enter-
prise. In addition, there appears to have been an absolute prohibition
on payments of technical assistance fees among similarly related enter-
prises. This would suggest that certain underlying attitudes regarding
TNCs have dominated the policy-making process within the Royalty
Committee in its denial of these intra-company payments.
Another interesting aspect of the policy of the Royalty Com-
mittee is with respect to the distinction made under the law between
technical assistance and technical services. The foreign currency to
be remitted for the payment for technical services rendered from
abroad need only be registered with the Exchange Office of the
Central Bank, according to the letter of the law." The criteria of the
23. Decree Law 1900 of September 15, 1973, 43 LECISaLCION ECONOUMCA
256 (1973).
24. See note 2 supra.
25. Decree Law 444 of March 22, 1967, Article 101, 30 LEGISLACiON ECONO-
MIcA 203 (1967).
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Central Bank include whether the cost of the services exceeds the
usual price, and whether the services are socially, economically, tech-
nically, or culturally useful for the country.26
Agreements involving royalties to be paid for licenses of indus-
trial property rights, however, must be registered with the Royalty
Committee.2 The criteria to be applied by the Royalty Committee
in evaluating and approving these agreements include the usefulness
of the contract in the economic and social development of the country,
the possibility of producing the product without the license, the
effect on the national balance of payments, the status of international
practice in the area, the size of the market for which the product is
designed, and other considerations. 2  Thus, Colombian legislation
establishes more stringent tests for "royalty payments" than for "tech-
nical fees."
Normal capital investments must be approved by the National
Planning Department and the Central Bank. Thus, where a capital
investment is to be made that involves some technical services and
possibly technical assistance provided from abroad which would be
compensated in foreign currency, it is arguable that this application
need not be brought before the Royalty Committee at all. It appears,
however, that in some cases, foreign investors have given up requests
for payments for technical assistance or services in return for the
necessary investment approval from the Royalty Committee.
The imbalances which these laws were designed to correct are
well known,29 and they are not the subject of this article. Nor will
there be any attempt to comment on the appropriateness of various
types of provisions in license agreements which the laws expressly
prohibit. It can be assumed that the effectiveness of this legal regime
has been evaluated by officials within the Colombian Government
since its enactment in 1967.
There is a strong perception on the part of many TNCs, however,
that the regulatory climate in Colombia, including the restrictive
conditions for registration of capital or technology agreements, has
been responsible in varying degrees for the decisions made by some of
the companies not to participate actively in the Colombian market.
26. Id., art. 102, at 203.
27. Id.
28. See note 23 supra.
29. See, e.g., Vaitsos, Opci6nes Estrat6gicas en la Commercializaci6n de
Technologia: El Punta de Vista de los Paises en Desarrollo, COMEcio EXTERIOR
(May 1971).
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On the other hand, the National Monetary Board has manifested
a totally different attitude with its Resolution 29 of December 1978.0
This Resolution permits the reinvestment of "limbo money" 31 of up
to fifty percent of registered capital in the same and ongoing opera-
tions of the foreign company, on the condition that it reinvest the
remaining fifty percent in certain types of development bonds to be
issued by the Institute of Industrial Development.3 2  This step has
been viewed by many members of the foreign investment community
as a very encouraging sign.
The inference is clear that a more flexible approach to the ap-
plication of the legal framework to foreign capital and technology is
necessary. The analysis of the technology agreements to be registered
should be conducted on a qualitative basis in addition to the quantita-
tive basis now applied. The success of regulation and control systems
in Mexico, 33 for example, is due to a pragmatic enforcement flexibility
that permits the government officials to decide on a case-by-case basis
whether or not the technology may be useful to the country's economic
and social development. The distinctions must be based upon the
reasonableness of the proposed transactions, and practical and political
considerations, including the accomplishment of national policies.
VII. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CAPITAL AND TECHNOLOGY
Earlier in this article, a definition of technology was provided by
describing its function.34 Capital, one of the traditional factors of
production as identified by classical economists, includes human re-
sources, currency, equipment, and technology-both tangible and in-
tangible-as described herein.
A. Allocation of Limited Resources
The government of any country, developing or industrialized,
must allocate its resources to the accomplishment of its objectives. The
30. Resolution 29 of 1978 of the National Council of Economic and Social
Policy, a division of the National Planning Department, 53 LEciSLACiON ECONO-
MICA 348 (1979).
31. "Limbo money" is defined as earnings in excess of 27% (formerly 19%
before ANCOM Decision 103), or the amount in excess of 20% to be remitted
as dividends, plus 7% to be reinvested. See Radway, Venezuela: Certain Legal
Considerations for Doing Business, 8 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 301 (1976).
32. Instituto de Fomento Industrial (Colombian Government Industrial De-
velopment Institute).
33. See Hyde and Ramirez de la Corte, Mexico, in TECHNOLOGY TANSFER:
LAWS AND PRACTICE IN LATIN AMERICA (1978).
34. See Sec. III supra.
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objectives that governments set forth to accomplish include those
characterized as social, economic, or political. No government ever
had adequate resources to allocate for the accomplishment of all of
its objectives. The Government of Colombia is no exception. Govern-
ment planners and those responsible at the highest levels must make
careful evaluations and assign priorities. Resources will then be al-
located in accordance with the potential return likely to be generated.
This is true with human resources as well as with budgeted funds or
appropriations, equipment, and technology.
The problem faced by the TNCs is very similar. They too have
limited resources and insufficient personnel to assign to all of the
projects they wish to undertake worldwide. They also do not have
adequate capital to finance research and development, as well as invest-
ment projects in those countries identified as potentially profitable, in
addition to funding continuing operations at home. Thus, decisions to
allocate their resources, including personnel, funds, equipment, and
technology, will be made only after a careful evaluation of cost, benefit,
and relative priorities.
B. Separate Characteristics and Separate Returns
Each category of capital, as defined above, possesses separate
characteristics. The application of each capital asset, therefore, is dif-
ferentiated by the requirement for a separately identified return for
the investment of the asset. For example, a human resource (i.e., an
individual technician or engineer) offers his or her services to the
employer in return for a salary. So, too, the owner of a piece of equip-
ment-a capital asset-offers the use of that equipment in return for
a payment designed to offset the depreciation in value and amortiza-
tion of the cost of the asset plus a small profit. This could be in the
form of a lease rental or similar payment. Invested capital generates
a return in the form of a dividend, i.e., a rental for the use of the money
invested for a period of time.
C. Tangible Technology Entitled to a Return
In the same manner, when a corporation offers technology that
it has developed through extensive research and development over a
period of years and has perfected it by the experience in commercial-
izing that particular technology, also developed at great expense over
the years, that asset is entitled to a separate economic return. This is
without regard to whether the contribution of that technology is made
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to a related or affiliated corporation, such as a subsidiary in a foreign
country. Thus, for the license of the right to use certain patents or
trademarks granted to its subsidiary, a TNC is entitled to the contribu-
tion of a royalty from its subsidiary in that foreign country. This is
in the form of a rental payment for the use of that capital asset and
the technology it has developed at great expense.
D. Intangible Technology: Technical Assistance
A transnational corporation will also assign various technicians,
engineers, or others with substantial experience to assist the subsidiary
in commercializing the use of the technology granted by the patent
license. For this separate capital allocation, the corporation is entitled
to an entirely separate return in the form of a fee for technical assist-
ance, notwithstanding that there is a capital relationship between the
parent and its foreign subsidiary taking the form of a majority equity
ownership.
E. Intangible Technology: Training
Finally, for the training which the parent corporation renders to
the employees of its subsidiary in the form of technical services, it is
entitled to an entirely separate payment or compensation in the
form of a technical services fee for the allocation of the human resources
assigned to conduct the training in the foreign country or in the home
office. Like the individual employee who receives separate returns for
totally different types of capital contributions, the TNC is entitled
to separate returns for its different contributions of capital (in-
cluding invested equity, technology, and the assignment of human
resources in the form of technical assistance or technical services for
training or otherwise). A parallel illustration of this analysis is that
a Colombian company must pay interest on a loan, whether it is pro-
vided from a Colombian bank, a foreign bank, or its foreign parent
company.
The dilemma is now defined. To obtain these services, the
majority-owned subsidiary must reimburse the home office for the costs
of the engineer, technician, or operations specialist, including a reason-
able profit, or at least a contribution to the general and administrative
overhead costs of assigning home office personnel abroad. The Co-
lombian subsidiary, however, is barred from making such payments
for this "intangible technology" by Article 21 of Decision 24, as
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implemented by Decree 1900, in conjunction with Article 1(j) of
Decree 1234."
VIII. TnEoriEs BELIEVED USED TO JUsTrFY THE DENIAL OF INTRA-
COMPANY PAYMENTS FOR INTANGIBLE TECHNOLOGY
There are essentially two theories which have been adopted by
Colombia and other Latin American countries, particularly in ANCOM,
Argentina, and Brazil at different times, to prohibit the payment of
royalties or technical assistance fees from majority-owned local sub-
sidiaries to their foreign parent.
A. Economic Unity Doctrine
The first of these is the so-called "economic unity theory," first
adopted in Argentina in the famous Parke-Davis " and Swift de Ia
Plata '7 cases in the early 1970s. The Swift case involved the insolvency
of the Argentine subsidiary and the rights of creditors and debtors in
an extremely complex factual situation. The facts of the Parke-Davis
case are more straightforward. The two cases differ substantially, how-
ever, in that the Swift case had significant political overtones. The
confrontation that ensued between the Argentine government and the
foreign parent company (Deltec), therefore, appears to have been based
more on emotional and political reactions than on legal principles and
the interpretation of the facts. The Parke-Davis case, on the other
hand, appears to have involved more of a direct application of the eco-
nomic unity doctrine. This doctrine declares that the subsidiary is a
mere instrumentality of its foreign parent corporation, and therefore,
the legal and economic consequences of the actions of the subsidiary
are to be imputed to its foreign parent. The inference from this theory
is that nothing of value is being provided to the subsidiary which would
not otherwise be provided, so the parent should not be permitted to
receive royalties or fees for intangible technological contributions made
to the subsidiary.
This doctrine is analogous to the common law doctrine referred
to as "piercing the corporate veil." In Anglo-American law, the legal
result of separate legal or corporate entities will be disregarded by
the courts only when it can be shown that a corporation is a mere
35. See Decree Law 1234, supra note 22, at 25.
36. See generally Gordon, Argentine Jurisprudence: The Parke-Davis and
Deltec Cases, 6 LAw. AM. 320 (1974).
37. Id.
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instrumentality or agent of another corporation or individual which
owns most of its equity or voting stock. Mere ownership of such a
majority, however, does not alone justify departure from the protec-
tion traditionally afforded by incorporation under Anglo-American
common law principles. There must be such domination of finances,
policies, and practices that the controlled corporation has no existence
of its own and acts as a mere business conduit for its principal. The
principle is essentially an equitable one that the "corporate veil" will
be pierced only when it is essential to hold the "real" party liable as
a matter of justice. These rigid standards or tests must be satisfied
under Anglo-American law in order to invoke this doctrine. To the
author's knowledge, there is no parallel civil law concept in Colombia
or the other Latin American countries.
The Parke-Davis economic unity doctrine was reversed by sub-
sequent decisions of higher courts 3B in Argentina. The concept found
its way into the Foreign Investment Law,3" which was also "reversed"
when that Law was superseded in 1976.4o It seems, therefore, that the
economic unity doctrine was invoked more as a political act than as
a matter of law based on juridical principles.
B. Taxation Theory
Many sources have suggested that the motivation for the rule
prohibiting payment of license royalties or technical assistance fees
from a local subsidiary to its controlling foreign parent has its origins
in principles of taxation. Thus, in most of the countries where the law
prohibits such payments, the law also specifies that such payments
will not be deductible for purposes of computation of the profits tax of
the local subsidiary."
For many years, the International Fiscal Association, in its delibera-
tions, has considered the taxation consequences of various payments
from a subsidiary to its foreign parent. One concept, which is possibly
the one that gave rise to the so-called economic unity theory, centers
on the distinction between a "permanent establishment" and a legal
38. See Gordon, Argentine Jurisprudence: Deltec Update, 11 LAW. AM. 43(1979).
39. Law 20,557 [1973] C. Anales 3670, 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1489
(1973).
40. Law 21,382 [1976] C. Anales 2071, 15 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1364
(1976); see generally McKinnis, The Argentine Foreign Investment Law of
1976, 17 COLUM. J. TSANSNAT'L L. 1 (1978).
41. E.g., Nattier, Brazil in TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: LAWS AND PRACTICE IN
LAwrm Am UcA 145, 158 (1978).
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subsidiary. The permanent establishment is, from a legal point of
view, a dependent division of the company, otherwise referred to as
a "branch." The establishment is not legally independent and is, there-
fore, not entitled to receive royalty payments for intangible contribu-
tions, although profits from the permanent establishment are taxable
in the country of domicile as if it were an independent legal entity.
These distinctions are very technical, but wholly supportable from a
legal point of view. Taxes on branch profits are generally withheld at
the source, so that the host country is assured of its proportionate
share of the tax revenues from the income generated by the economic
activities of the branch.
Changes in the tax rules in recent years in capital exporting
(industrialized) countries have further complicated this already com-
plex field. Home country tax authorities, such as those in the United
States, have long provided dividend exclusions when the accounts of
related corporations are consolidated in the annual statement. Changes
in rules affecting the timing of the imposition of taxes on the accumu-
lated earnings or profits of a subsidiary of a U.S. corporation 42 have
significantly affected decisions concerning declaration of dividends from
those subsidiaries to their foreign parent.
Considerable opinion exists that the concept of a permanent
establishment or branch, as distinguished from an independently in-
corporated subsidiary, is not well understood in developing countries
generally. This confusion has been observed in statements and trans-
actions regarding activities of these branches and the treatment of
capital and income taxes. Because of this confusion, it seems likely
that the prohibition on intra-company royalty and technical assistance
payments is a result of a suspicion of tax evasion. The tax conse-
quences of this prohibition are that the subsidiary pays a higher tax
in the host country. The commercial consequences, however, may be
to discourage the allocation of these capital resources (intangible
technological contributions) from the foreign parent to its majority-
owned subsidiary.
IX. RELATIONSHIP OF TRANSNATIONALS TO LocAL COMPANIES
Much has been said but little has been written or documented
about the relationship of TNCs to local companies. What has generally
been expressed in public, as well as in the literature that is available,
42. Such practices are commonly known as "deferral" principles.
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are accusations and allegations concerning transfer pricing and other
practices described earlier.
A. Relationship Between Parents and Affiliated Companies
Transnational corporations provide the intangible technological
contributions to their affiliates that exploit the tremendous experience
gathered from operations in developing countries all over the world.
While no two countries share identical conditions, these firms bring
impressive perspective, insight, and sheer experience to their local
affiliates. Moreover, it clear that the TNCs do not necessarily provide
this intangible technology to their affiliates in developing countries.
In direct contrast to the notion of "obligation" underlying the eco-
nomic unity theory mentioned earlier, the transnationals are concerned
about each transaction paying its own way.
When the international vice-president of a TNC receives a request
from the general manager of a plant in a developing country, that
vice-president must negotiate with some of his domestic (U.S.) divisions
to acquire the services of the appropriate technician, engineer, or
other specialist to be sent to Colombia for technical assistance or
training. These transactions are executed on an inter-divisional work
account basis, which means that the international division must re-
imburse the domestic division for the assignment of the individual
involved. Therefore, where laws and policies like those prevailing in
Colombia prevent reimbursement by the subsidiary, the cost-benefit
analysis results in a negative "bottom line." The decision is thus made
that the assignment cannot be economically justified and will not be
made.
B. Relationship with Unaffiliated Companies
The situation is very different when the TNC is working to-
gether with a local company in which the former does not own a
majority interest. Under these circumstances, the laws and policies
in Colombia permit the TNC to receive royalty payments and tech-
nical assistance fees for intangible technological contributions.
But how much will the international vice-president fight for the
appropriate specialists to be sent to Colombia for an unaffiliated (or
minority participation) company where the TNC has less control
over effective application of the intangible technology? The obvious
inference is that, where there is both a capital and a technological con-
tribution, the TNC has more at stake and, if the economic justification
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were adequate, would very likely allocate the additional resources
necessary to improve the efficiency, productivity, and economic bene-
fit for these types of operations.
C. Necessity for Production Efficiency and Quality
There are serious political difficulties that must be faced by high-
level government officials with respect to the troublesome area of
improving production efficiency and quality. In order for a nation
to improve production efficiency, promote exports, and be competitive
on the international export market, it must utilize the experience,
technology, and skill available to improve the production process and
the efficiency of the workers. This sometimes results in the use of
more capital-intensive equipment and technology. In Colombia and
other ANCOM countries, however, there is a need for labor-intensive
industry to absorb the new additions to the work force and create
jobs for those willing and able to work. This conflict is invariably
resolved by political decisions.
The problem is further complicated by the results when efficiency
is not introduced into the system. Industries that receive protective
assistance from the government have been producing at inefficient
levels for many years. The prices of their products are completely out
of line with those on the international market. The Colombian con-
sumer bears the burden. Opening up the market to an increased amount
of competition from imports would result in greater efficiency as local
producers responded to the import competition. It would also result
in displacement of some local producers, with the consequent effect
on employment. Under most conditions, this is politically unacceptable.
However, it is interesting to note that Argentina, Chile, and, to a lesser
degree, Peru and Mexico, have recently modified their system of con-
trolling imports to permit greater import competition and improve
production efficiency in the long term, even at the cost of some dis-
placement of local producers.
One of the important elements of improving production efficiency
is the system of controlling quality in manufacturing and food process-
ing. One of the most important contributions made by TNCs is the
transfer of detailed procedures, manuals, specifications, and other data
to provide flesh and muscle to the backbone of quality control systems.
In addition, individual specialists, technicians, inspectors, and others
in this field are sent on an ongoing basis from the TNC to its local
subsidiary in order to provide continuing education in new techniques
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and the skills required to introduce and upgrade the quality control
system. This is a clear example of the intangible technological contri-
bution which Colombia must receive in order to accomplish its own
goals.
D. Transnational Attitudes: Risk versus Payoff
The resources of the transnationals, as described above, include
the worldwide experience of adapting technology in developing coun-
tries under a variety of climatic, environmental, cultural, social, and
economic conditions. The capacity to furnish ongoing technical assist-
ance to demonstrate, assist, and train the employees of the local
subsidiary in the techniques and skills necessary to conduct an efficient
and profitable operation are additional resources of these international
firms. The present rigid application of the legal framework in Co-
lombia results in the denial of a separate economic reward to the
transnational for risking the allocation of these resources, with results
that are inimical to the goals of the Colombian government.
X. ANCOM DECISION 24
Article 21 of ANCOM Decision 24 " expressly prohibits the pay-
ment of royalties for intangible technological contributions that are
provided to a local company by a foreign firm with majority interest
in the local company. This restriction does not apply to the royalties
for patent or trademark licenses under the same circumstances. Ar-
ticle 1(j) of Colombian Decree 1234 44 establishes the link between
the technology and the capital of the enterprise as a criterion to be
considered by the Royalty Committee in its evaluation of a proposed
technology transfer agreement. In other words, the Colombian policy
requires the Royalty Committee to examine whether or not this tech-
nology transfer also involves common capital of the two enterprises.
In practice, the result has been the absolute denial of permission for
royalty payments or technical assistance fees for these intangible
technological contributions from a foreign parent to its controlled
Colombian subsidiary.
Article 37 of Decision 24,4' limiting profit remittances to fourteen
percent, has since been modified by Decision 10346 to increase the
43. See note 2 supra.
44. See note 22 supra.
45. See note 4 supra.
46. ANCOM Decision 103 conformed to the Common Rules for Treatment of
Foreign Capital and for Trademarks, Patents, Licenses and Royalties, October
30, 1976. See 16 Ir'rL LECAL MATERLALS 138 (1977).
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ceiling to twenty percent. Decision 103 also provides that each mem-
ber country may authorize higher percentages if it deems it appro-
priate or in its national interest to do so." The only other requirement
is that the nation inform the Commission in Lima of its determination.
These modifications evolved in response to a clear recognition that the
economic reward was inadequate to attract the capital required to
augment indigenous capital formation in the Andean Group and foster
the necessary levels of economic development.
XI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Two recommendations are offered for specific action. First, al-
though the Royalty Committee has criteria which it has been apply-
ing to technology agreements under evaluation, it is believed that
additional criteria should be adopted to permit an analysis of a more
qualitative nature. Second, the specific provision under scrutiny herein
should be modified to provide a more flexible tool for Colombian
Government policy-makers.
A. Establishing Criteria for Intangible Technology
Intangible technological contributions will vary considerably. To
establish appropriate criteria providing adequate safeguards for the
payment of royalties or technical assistance fees from the local subsidi-
ary to its foreign parent, a qualitative analysis should be applied. The
two most common tests that have been generally accepted and appear
to prevail in international practice include the "arm's length" test,48 and
the "value-received" test.4 ' The former would evaluate the transaction
47. Id. at art. 10.
48. See Debatin, General Report, The Recognition of Services and License
of Incorporeal Rights Between Parent Companies and Their Foreign Subsidiaries:
Avoidance of Double Taxation in Case of Non-Recognition by Tax Administrators,
54A CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL (1969). Cahiers de Droit Fiscal
International is the official publication of the International Fiscal Association.
The "arm's length test" refers to criteria that the price established between the
supplier and the recipient of technology be equal to a price when the parties
were dealing at arm's length and were not related or affiliated entities. This is
also referred to as a prevailing price on the international market. The latest
Argentine law on technology transfer has adopted this approach in Article 9.
See Radway and Giaechino, supra note 7, at 228.
49. Id. The "value-received test" is also referred to in the Debatin Report
in terms of satisfaction of a genuine interest of the recipient or royalties paid for
something that is of benefit to the business in some way, even if the recipient is
a subsidiary of the supplier. An interesting point is made in the Debatin Report:
At this point the question arises whether and to what extent such an ap-
proach allows a line to be drawn between the field of royalties and that
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to determine whether the amount paid would be approximately
* equal to that in a transaction among unrelated parties. The latter
would look to the actual interests of the party receiving the intangible
technological contribution to examine the benefit or value received.
Resolution (recommendation) 6 of the Seventh Latin American
Tax Law Congress adopted in January 1976, regarding agreements
between developing and developed countries concerning payments of
royalties, technical assistance fees, dividends and interest, provides as
follows: "For tax purposes, allied firms must be treated according to
the general principles applying to independent firms, provided the re-
spective control mechanisms are applied." Under the Resolution, like
the position of the International Fiscal Association deferred to earlier,
no discrimination would be made as to the source of the technology.
The result of the Royalty Committee policy (arising from Article
21 of Decision 24 " and Article 1(j) of Decree 1234 "1) is to encourage
the entry of foreign capital, because up to twenty percent 52 of regis-
tered profits can be remitted and fifty percent 3 of earnings reinvested
with the purchase of bonds from the Ministry of Economic Develop-
ment. Continuing contributions of intangible technology, however,
the essential element which makes the capital more productive for the
society and more adaptable to local conditions, are discouraged.
B. Modification of Article 21
The discussion above noted that Decision 103 had modified Deci-
sion 24 by raising the profit remittance ceiling to twenty percent in
of what comes under the arrangement of the inter-corporate relationship
between parent and subsidiary and which, by nature, cannot be the sub-
ject of a licensing agreement or give rise to the payment of a service
remuneration. An approach as the aforementioned-which for most
countries would mean a major departure from the present line of think-
ing-would imply recognizing that there is a justification in making
payments even for "interests" which emerge only in circumstances pecu-
liar to a parent-subsidiary relationship and which therefore cannot
exist in relation to third parties. After all, the . . . report also points
out that the special measure of common interests existing in a parent-
subsidiary relationship results in the fact that the things one of these
companies does for the other are more comprehensive and thorough
than in the dealings with any third party licensee.
Id. at 37.
50. See note 2 supra.
51. See note 22 supra.
52. See Article 10 of ANCOM Decision 103, supra note 46.
53. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
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order to continue to attract capital deemed essential for the economic
growth and development of the region. It is suggested that, by analogy
to the philosophy of Decision 103, a member country of the Andean
Pact could modify the intra-company payments prohibition of Article
21 of Decision 24 in those cases where the member country makes the
the determination that such is justified to promote the national interest.
It is argued that intangible technological contributions are pre-
cisely the type of technology required for solving a range of problems
faced by Colombia and other developing nations, including: (a) the
production, marketing, and distribution problems of the food process-
ing and manufacturing industries; (b) the development of remote (out-
lying) processing facilities near the sources of agricultural and other
raw materials; (c) the development of an infrastructure of small sup-
pliers to provide raw, semi-processed, and processed materials and
other prerequisites to contribute to a more integrated and rational pro-
ductive system; (d) the improvement of quality standards and control
systems to augment production, increase efficiency, stimulate compe-
tition, and promote exports; and (e) the mobilization and training of
human resources throughout all sectors of the national economy.
The intangible technological contribution is the key to successful
transfer of technology, and to economic and social development gener-
ally. The Colombian Government stated many times during 1979 that
it was reviewing its foreign investment and technology transfer policies
in the context of a new National Development Plan. Article 21 of
Decision 24 should be modified to attract technology and the capacity
to manage technological innovation in conjunction with the New Plan.
The time is right to initiate the change for the 1980s.
